Louisiana Law Review
Volume 76 | Number 4
Liber Amicorum: Alain A. Levasseur
A Louisiana Law Review Symposium of the Civil Law
Summer 2016

From Wedding Bells to Working Women:
Unmasking the Sexism Resulting from “Illicit
Concubinage” in Louisiana’s Jurisprudence
Brittanie Wagnon

Repository Citation
Brittanie Wagnon, From Wedding Bells to Working Women: Unmasking the Sexism Resulting from “Illicit Concubinage” in Louisiana’s
Jurisprudence, 76 La. L. Rev. (2016)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol76/iss4/20

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

From Wedding Bells to Working Women: Unmasking
the Sexism Resulting from “Illicit Concubinage” in
Louisiana’s Jurisprudence
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................ 1384
I.

First Comes Love, Then Comes Marriage? ................................ 1386
A. The Explosive Growth of Cohabitation and Its
Clouded Origins ................................................................... 1386
B. Women’s Push for Cohabitation .......................................... 1389

II.

Other Jurisdictions’ Responses to Cohabitation ......................... 1390
A. The American View of Cohabitation: Before and After ...... 1391
1. The Traditional Negative Status .................................... 1391
2. Inequity Caused by the Traditional View in
America Transformed the Law ...................................... 1393
B. Approaches Used by Multiple Jurisdictions......................... 1394
1. The Imposition of a Legal Status ................................... 1394
a. The “Not-So-Common” Law Marriage
Approach ................................................................. 1394
b. The ALI’s 2001 Chapter 6 Principles: A
Revival of Common Law Marriage?....................... 1395
c. Washington’s Unique “Committed Intimate
Relationship” Status ................................................ 1396
d. New Zealand’s Domestic Partnership Laws ........... 1397
2. The Marvin Contractual Approach ................................ 1398
3. France’s Blending of the Intermediate Status
and Contract Approach .................................................. 1399

III. Paramours, Concubines, and “Illicit Concubinage” in
Louisiana .................................................................................... 1400
A. Louisiana’s Harsh Treatment of Cohabitation ..................... 1401
B. The Eroded Rationale of Louisiana’s Negative
Status Approach ................................................................... 1404
1. Public Policy: The Alleged Immorality of
Concubinage .................................................................. 1405
2. Guardians of the Sanctity of Marriage........................... 1407
IV. Unmasking the Sexist Effects of Louisiana’s Laws
Regarding Concubinage ............................................................. 1409
A. The Effects of Louisiana’s Laws Regarding Concubinage .. 1409

1384

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

B. Lack of Legal Grounds for the State’s Purported “Public
Policy” Condemning Cohabitation ...................................... 1413
C. Previous Failed Solutions to the Inequity in
Louisiana’s Law ................................................................... 1414
1. Rejection of Marvin ....................................................... 1415
2. The Rejection of Proposed Article 101 in the
Wake of the Repeal of Article 1481 .............................. 1415
3. Commentary Calling for Change ................................... 1417
4. Louisiana’s 2004 Defense of Marriage Amendment ..... 1417
D. The Solution: A Presumption of Equality ............................ 1418
Conclusion .................................................................................. 1419
INTRODUCTION
Cohabitation is the new normal.1 Today’s normal, however, can be
confusing to a generation that grew up with marriage as the only option
for romantic couples. But to today’s couples, cohabitation is either an
alternative to marriage or a stepping-stone to marriage. Contemporary
studies have shown that the majority of those who get married today are
wealthy white couples.2 Meanwhile, women of lower socioeconomic
status are less likely to get married.3 Instead, these women push for
cohabitation to protect their assets, and they have become the driving force
behind the shift from marriage to cohabitation.4
Historically, Louisiana stigmatized women who chose cohabitation,
referring to them as concubines and denying them legal rights.5 Beginning
in the 1970s, most states began to recognize and respond to the injustices
that the stigmatization of cohabitation created.6 For example, dissolution

Copyright 2016, by BRITTANIE WAGNON.
1. Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of
Research Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 4–5 (2000);
see infra Part I.
2. See Smock, supra note 1, at 4–5; Marin Clarkberg, The Price of Partnering:
The Role of Economic Well-Being in Young Adults’ First Union Experiences, 77
SOC. FORCES 945, 947 (1999).
3. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 947; Smock, supra note 1, at 4.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. For an explanation of Louisiana’s historical view of concubinage, see
Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1129 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Succession of Filhiol, 44 So. 843 (La. 1907)).
6. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (allowing
a cohabiting woman to recover under contract theory to prevent inequity).
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of a relationship by death or separation often left a woman destitute.7 To
correct this inequity, every other community property state in the United
States now provides a remedy for cohabitants to claim property rights upon
dissolution of the relationship.8 Overall, 46 states have created some sort
of contractual or status-based remedy for this inequity.9 In the midst of the
United States’ movement to accept cohabiting couples that has gained
traction and entrenched itself over the past 40 years, Louisiana’s
stubborn refusal to follow the rest of the country’s example is puzzling.
This Comment offers a solution to that puzzle, arguing that
Louisiana’s refusal to provide property rights for unmarried cohabitants
is the result of discrimination against some of the state’s neediest
citizens.10 Louisiana’s jurisprudence often provides unfair results to
women, and when accompanied by statistics showing that women are the
main advocates of cohabitation,11 Louisiana’s refusal to act appears
motivated by a desire to discriminate. This failure to change the law is a
thinly veiled attempt to retain the status quo of the past where marriage
was the only path for women to be successful. To correct the situation,
this Comment proposes a solution that is best aligned with Louisiana’s
needs—a presumption of an equal-sharing agreement between romantic
partners upon dissolution.
Part I demonstrates that the significant number of cohabiting couples
creates a need for the legislature to act, and also explores who engages in
cohabitation and why the practice has become so popular. Part II describes
the evolution of cohabitants’ rights in the American courts and legislatures.
This Part also surveys the various approaches in the United States, New
Zealand, and France to afford rights to cohabitants. Part III explains
Louisiana’s archaic views regarding unmarried cohabitation and why the
State chooses to cling to this reasoning. Part IV scrutinizes the sexist biases
in Louisiana’s jurisprudence and argues that Louisiana can no longer justify
discriminating against cohabitants. This Part also proposes a solution that
7. See id. at 109 (noting that the plaintiff agreed to stop working and be the
defendant’s housekeeper in return for his financial support).
8. Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 587 (2013).
9. Id.
10. Even though marriage as an institution offers concrete benefits and
protections for many, the Louisiana Civil Code currently excludes from this
category not only unmarried heterosexual cohabitants, but also homosexuals. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 89 (2014). See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14–556 (U.S.
2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses require a state to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when
their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed in another state).
11. See infra Part I.B.
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will fix the frequent inequity in Louisiana and calls for the change women
deserve—the ability to decide for themselves whether marriage is indeed
the best option by which to transfer property rights.
I. FIRST COMES LOVE, THEN COMES MARRIAGE?
The number of couples choosing cohabitation instead of marriage has
grown exponentially over the years and it continues to rise.12 Cohabitation
is popular because of society’s need for individualism, its changing values,
and economic factors unique to modern culture.13 Women of lower
socioeconomic status14 and working women have been the main
proponents behind cohabitation’s popularity.15 Many women choose not
to marry to protect their economic freedom. Cohabitation is more popular
among poor women because marriage seems to represent a wealthy status
symbol, and the housewife stigma associated with marriage troubles some
career women.16 Because of this desire, cohabitation has become an
important family status in America.
A. The Explosive Growth of Cohabitation and Its Clouded Origins
Chabitation is the most common path to initiating family life.17 In
1960, approximately 440,000 unmarried American couples were living
together.18 By 1990, the number had climbed to 2.85 million and continued
climbing to 4.9 million in early 2000.19 In 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau
12. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946; see also Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces
Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
135, 159–60 (2005).
13. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946.
14. Smock, supra note 1, at 4.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 957–58.
17. See id. at 945. This Comment considers the term “family life” to mean
“the basic unit in society traditionally consisting of two parents rearing their
children” and “any of various social units differing from but regarded as
equivalent to the traditional family.” Full Definition of Family, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/family (last
visited Mar. 14, 2015).
18. Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privileges for Cohabiting Parents: Protecting
Children Inside and Outside of Marriage, 70 LA. L. REV. 751, 752 (2010).
19. Id. The number of unmarried couples who are cohabitating has expanded
overall by 1,000%, from 500,000 in 1970 to over 5,000,000 in 2000. V. Michael
Brigner, Cohabitation, in BALDWIN’S OHIO PRAC. DOMESTIC REL. L. § 2:66 (4th
ed. 2014).
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reported that for the first time in history, married couples made up less
than half of all American households.20 By 2011, 7.6 million opposite-sex
couples were living together as unmarried cohabitants.21 Further, the
majority of marriages and remarriages begin as cohabiting relationships.22
Although cohabitation has grown in popularity exponentially, the
reasons for this phenomenon are much less clear. Sociologists point to
three factors that contribute to this change:23 (1) the shifting values in
modern society, (2) the American need for individual autonomy, and (3) a
changing economic climate.24 Historically, American values developed
from “religious tradition, frontier experience, ceaseless change, vast
opportunity, and fluid social structure.”25 Core values shift over time
among individuals in keeping with the American spirit of change.26 These
shifts in values and attitudes about gender roles have made cohabitation
more popular.27
Cohabitation is appealing to young adults because of its consistency
with individualism and secularism as compared to marriage.28 Cohabitors
tend to reject traditional gender roles while embracing the ideals of
individualism, personal autonomy, and equity in each partner’s
contribution to the household.29 Those who choose to cohabit are generally
more liberal, less religious, and more supportive of both egalitarian gender
roles and nontraditional family roles.30 Young adults’ attitudes toward

20. Sabrina Tavernise, Married Couples are No Longer a Majority, Census
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A22; see also Mark Mather & Diana Lavery,
In U.S., Proportion Married at Lowest Recorded Levels, PRB (Sept. 2010),
http://www.prb.org/Articles/2010/usmarriagedecline.aspx; see also Aloni, supra
note 8, at 580.
21. Aloni, supra note 8, at 580; see also Mather & Lavery, supra note 20; see
also Tavernise, supra note 20.
22. Smock, supra note 1, at 1.
23. Id. at 5; see also Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946.
24. Smock, supra note 1, at 5; see also Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946.
25. Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U. L.
REV. 175, 180 (2012) (quoting ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 440, 458–59 (3d ed. 1970)).
26. Id. at 181.
27. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946.
28. Smock, supra note 1, at 5.
29. Jules Brine & Kara Joyner, The Ties That Bind: Principles of Cohesion
in Cohabitation and Marriage, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 333, 351 (1999).
30. Smock, supra note 1, at 4.
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divorce are also changing.31 The very real threat of a failed marriage leads
many couples to experiment with cohabitation as a type of trial period.32
Economic factors unique to modern culture have also increased the
allure of cohabitation.33 These factors include the rising rate of female
participation in the labor force and the decline of wealth during young
adulthood.34 Financial obstacles provide one of the main reasons for why
many couples choose cohabitation over marriage.35 Those couples that
cohabit are generally in worse financial shape than couples that get married,
and long periods of unemployment, lower educational attainment, and lower
joint incomes characterize their relationships.36 For those uncertain about
their financial prospects, living together and pooling resources in the short
run can be a smarter strategy than simply living alone.37 Therefore,
economic instability pushes couples toward living together and away from
getting married.
Meanwhile, marriage is now something of a status symbol for wealthy
couples. Social norms dictate an “acceptable” standard of living for married
couples, which puts pressure on adults to make a certain amount of money
before getting married.38 Many couples feel as if they lack the resources to
receive the social sanctioning of their union through marriage.39 Although
sharing a house should, as a practical matter, be cheaper than living alone,
social definitions of a suitable standard of living for a married couple make
marriage the more expensive choice.40 In contrast, cohabitation is a noninstitutionalized type of union that carries minimal normative standards. The
failure to meet a “suitable” level of income is not a barrier to cohabitation.41
Thus, cohabitation is a viable option for couples in the midst of changing
values and an uncertain financial outlook.

31. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 947 (“[P]eople who cohabit differ economically from people who
marry.”). Some have even dubbed cohabitation the “poor man’s marriage.” Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 963.
38. Id. at 949.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 950.
41. Id. at 951.
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B. Women’s Push for Cohabitation
Women are the driving force behind the increase in the rate of
cohabitation. Women across the economic spectrum choose cohabitation
to financially protect themselves. The practice of cohabitation is most
common among two groups of women: working women and those of low
socioeconomic status.42 The line between employed women and poor
women, however, is not a bright one. The reason is because women
typically accumulate less wealth than men due to inequalities in labor force
participation and earnings.43 This result is particularly true in Louisiana,
where a noticeably large pay gap between men and women persists.44
Although employed, women who earn less than their male counterparts
and women with low income and education have low marriage rates and
usually cohabit, but more-advantaged women tend to get married.45
Marriage is not as well suited for women in poverty as is cohabitation.
Low-income women face many barriers to marriage, including: gender
mistrust, abuse, infidelity, and financial strain.46 Marriage can create
dependencies on men, particularly in abusive relationships and other
situations that are ultimately unhealthy for the women involved.47
Marriage jeopardizes eligibility for welfare benefits, forcing poor couples
to choose between being married without welfare or remaining unmarried
with welfare.48 As a result, cohabiting women who receive welfare are

42. See id. at 956–57 (“In contrast to men, women with high earnings appear
to be relatively more attracted to cohabitation than men.”); Smock, supra note 1,
at 4.
43. Jonathan Vespa & Matthew A. Painter II, Cohabitation History,
Marriage, and Wealth Accumulation, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 983, 985 (2011).
44. Janet McConnaughey, Louisiana has Nation’s Biggest Pay Gap Between
Men and Women, WWLTV.COM (Sept. 18, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://www.wwltv.com
/story/news/local/2014/09/18/pay-gap-louisiana/15834737/ (“Louisiana has the
nation’s largest gender pay gap, with women paid about two thirds of what men are
paid . . . .”).
45. Vespa & Painter, supra note 43, at 998; see also Daniel T. Lichter,
Zhenchao Qian & Leanna M. Mellott, Marriage or Dissolution? Union
Transitions Among Poor Cohabiting Women, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 223, 237 (2006).
46. Lichter et al., supra note 45, at 225.
47. Deborah Roempke Graefe & Daniel T. Lichter, Marriage Among Unwed
Mothers: Whites, Blacks and Hispanics Compared, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 286, 292 (2002) (“For some women, however, [marriage] may
also create new dependencies on men that are ultimately unhealthy for everyone
involved—for example, in the case of abusive relationships.”).
48. Lichter et al., supra note 45, at 226.
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40% less likely to make the transition to marriage than those who do not
receive welfare.49
Women in poverty are not the only group that prefers cohabitation;
employed women also endorse cohabitation—albeit for a vastly different
reason. Working women see cohabitation as a way to protect their
economic assets. As more women have abandoned the traditional
homemaker role to work in the labor market, their financial independence
has increased.50 Unlike their male counterparts, marriage can hinder
women’s efforts to build successful careers.51 Although society has
traditionally assumed that women desired marriage for economic stability,
increased labor opportunities enable women to avoid marrying.52 Domestic
activity after marriage, particularly housework, typically increases for women
and decreases for men, which is a factor in why career women decide either
to not get married or to delay marriage.53 Women who have high earnings are
more attracted to cohabitation than marriage because of the stigma and social
expectation that a wife completes all of the household labor.54 Nonmarital
unions, however, are attractive because cohabiters in these arrangements
have greater equality than their marital counterparts who tend to adhere
more often to gender role stereotypes.55 Women in the labor force choose
cohabitation as the rational economic choice to deal with a gender-specific
hindrance to their careers that men do not have.
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ RESPONSES TO COHABITATION
Before the 1970s, America traditionally gave cohabitants a negative
status in the law and prohibited unmarried sexual partners from
contracting with each other. This status, however, produced inequities
where, upon dissolution, the male partner walked away with all of the
assets while the woman was left without a way of earning income. As a
49. Id. at 234.
50. Id. at 225.
51. Sharon Sassler & Robert Schoen, The Effect of Attitudes and Economic
Activity on Marriage, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 147, 149 (1999).
52. Id. at 148 (“Women were traditionally assumed to desire marriage (due
to economic dependency) more than men, but the increased economic opportunity
enables women to avoid marrying.”).
53. Id. at 149 (“Despite the widespread acceptance of women’s employment,
marriage appears to be less compatible with women’s efforts to build successful
careers than with men’s efforts. . . . Domestic activity after marriage, particularly
the amount of housework done, increases more for women than for men.”).
54. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 956–57.
55. Id. at 962.
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result, America abandoned this negative view in the 1970s, and most states
have since afforded some sort of mechanism for providing property rights
for unmarried cohabitants.56 Although the reasons for affording
cohabitating couples relief has changed, as the role of women in the
workforce has transformed, the problem of inequity still remains.
Louisiana remains one of only four states that have refused to provide
property rights for unmarried cohabitants, although other jurisdictions
employ various avenues for affording these rights.57 Other jurisdictions
employ a status approach, contract approach, or a blend of the two
approaches to provide property rights.58
A. The American View of Cohabitation: Before and After
America originally viewed cohabitation negatively and did not allow
property rights to unmarried cohabitants, which produced inequitable
results.59 Recognizing these results, the California Supreme Court decided the
landmark case of Marvin v. Marvin, which allowed cohabitants the right to
contract between each other regarding property.60 After this decision, many
states began to recognize the inequity of disallowing unmarried cohabitants’
property rights.61 Therefore, the Marvin decision led many states to
completely change their view towards cohabitation and created a shift in
attitudes, which ultimately led to the overall acceptance of cohabiting
relationships throughout the country.62
1. The Traditional Negative Status
Historically, America attributed a negative legal status to unmarried
cohabiting couples.63 Most legal statuses come with rights and

56. Glover, supra note 18, at 756; see also Aloni, supra note 8, at 587.
57. See Aloni, supra note 8, at 587 (“Only Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, and
Louisiana do not recognize cohabitants’ right to contract regarding their rights
and responsibilities toward each other.”).
58. See infra Part II.C.
59. See infra Part II.A.2.
60. 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
61. See infra Part II.A.2.
62. Id.
63. William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried
Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44. LA. L. REV. 1677,
1677 (1984); 1 LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE §
1:5, at 6 (2008) (“The term ‘legal status’ is used in the law to refer to a relationship
between persons that, by virtue of its existence, entails legal consequences.”).
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obligations,64 but this unique negative status prevented unmarried
cohabitants from contracting with each other.65 Marriage was customarily
the only option for romantic couples to transfer property rights and other
benefits between one another.66 The official purpose of marriage was to
channel the sexual desire between a man and a woman into an acceptable
institution that could provide a stable environment for any resulting
children.67 The government was interested in the purity of marriage
because the institution was supposedly “the foundation of the family and
of society.”68 This positive view of marriage caused the courts to attach a
negative stigma to cohabitation.69 Society ostracized couples choosing
cohabitation over wedlock for “living in sin” and classified those couples
as deviants.70 Courts viewed nonmarital cohabitation as “illicit” or
“meretricious” until 1976.71

64. Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation:
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1265, 1272 (2001) (“In marriage, rights and benefits accrue to parties during
their relationship by virtue of their marital status.”).
65. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1677 (arguing that instead of creating rights and
obligations between unmarried cohabitants like most legal statuses, the United
States imposed a unique negative legal status that disabled couples from
contracting with each other).
66. Id. at 1680.
67. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible
Retreat of Law from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 250 (2003).
Although this article speaks to Louisiana’s experience with marriage, the
Louisiana experience illustrates what has happened throughout the rest of the
United States. Id. at 244.
68. Hurry v. Hurry, 81 So. 378, 381 (La. 1919) (noting that marriage is an
institution “in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society” (quoting Maynard
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888))).
69. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1679 (“First, the courts felt it an appropriate
judicial function to condemn and punish cohabitants for their immorality in
engaging in sexual relations without the benefits of marriage.”).
70. Glover, supra note 18, at 751.
71. Brigner, supra note 19, § 2:66 (stating that “illicit” in this context means
“prohibited” and “meretricious” means “pertaining to an unlawful sexual
connection” and derives from the Latin word for prostitute); see also Marvin v.
Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding that contracts between
unmarried partners are enforceable, unless they were explicitly founded on sexual
services similar to that of prostitution, which would violate public policy). Marvin
ignited the trend away from a qualified disapproval of unmarried cohabitation. Id.
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2. Inequity Caused by the Traditional View in America Transformed
the Law
The public deemed cohabitation sinful, and the traditional American
view of unmarried cohabitants created inequitable results for partners
upon dissolution of the relationship. Courts’ decisions to follow precedent
that rendered agreements between partners unenforceable because they
were based upon the void consideration of sexual services produced
“cruelly unfair results.”72 Courts did not give unmarried cohabitants a
legally significant family status, which resulted in distinct hardships.73
Specifically, inequities often arose where the male cohabitant produced all
of the earnings and the female cohabitant produced none.74 In these cases,
the working partner, typically the man, would retain all of the family assets
because unmarried cohabitants were not subject to community property
laws.75 The law left the female partner without a remedy for such a dire
situation.
Because of the frequency with which this inequity occurred, courts
began to realize that lower-earning partners were in need of protection
from partners with more money who might take advantage of them.76
Before this realization, courts permitted the man to dishonor his equalsharing contract—a contract where cohabitants worked together as an
economic unit pursuant to an implied or express agreement concerning the
nature of their earnings.77 By dishonoring this contract, the man was
allowed to double the amount of gain he expected to have as his own when
the relationship ended.78 That harsh treatment failed to provide at least one
party in the relationship, usually the woman, with property rights as
punishment for the couple’s “illicit” relationship.79 This inequity caused
most of the country to develop a method of rectifying the problem, and to
abandon the traditionally negative status given to unmarried cohabitants.80
72. Brigner, supra note 19, § 2:66.
73. Id.
74. Charlotte K. Goldberg, Opting In, Opting Out: Autonomy in the
Community Property States, 72 LA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2011).
75. Id.
76. Charlotte K. Goldberg, Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and
Revival of Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483, 487
(2007).
77. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Symposium: Family Law, Introduction, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1545, 1550 (1984).
78. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1681.
79. Goldberg, supra note 76, at 538.
80. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 159–60.
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Nearly every state adopted an approach to honor agreements between
cohabitants, with only Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana
maintaining the antiquated approach.81
B. Approaches Used by Multiple Jurisdictions
Three predominant methods have emerged for dealing with unmarried
cohabitants’ property rights. The first is the legal status approach, which
imposes legal consequences based simply on the existence of a relationship
between two persons.82 The American Law Institute has endorsed this
approach.83 Foreign jurisdictions such as New Zealand can provide further
guidance on the legal status approach.84 The second, more common,
approach uses contract remedies to provide property rights upon dissolution
of the relationship.85 The third approach, which blends both the status and
contract approaches, is the French PACS, an intermediate contract-based
legal status that is not equivalent to marriage.86
1. The Imposition of a Legal Status
One way to afford cohabitants’ property rights is to impose a legal status
upon the parties if they meet certain requirements. There are multiple avenues
to implement the legal status approach, including the use of the following: (1)
common law marriage, (2) American Law Institute’s Chapter 6 Principles, (3)
Washington’s “Committed Intimate Relationship” Status, and (4) New
Zealand’s domestic partnership status.
a. The “Not-So-Common” Law Marriage Approach
The status approach in the United States has its origins in the doctrine
of common law marriage, which turns cohabitation into a lawful marriage
if the parties agree between themselves to be married and live together for

81. Glover, supra note 18, at 756; see also Aloni, supra note 8, at 587.
82. KELSO, supra note 63, § 1.5, at 6.
83. Eric L. Olsen, Note, How Do Courts Divide Property Acquired During a
Psuedomarital (Meretricious) Relationship?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 1091, 1092
(1992); Bill Atkin, The Challenge of Unmarried Cohabitation—The New Zealand
Response, 37 FAM. L.Q. 303, 303 (2003); David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of
Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law Institute’s Principles of
Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2001).
84. See infra Part II.C.1.d.
85. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
86. See infra Part II.C.3.
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a substantial period of time.87 Throughout the United States, however,
states have largely abolished this outdated practice.88 Courts originally
created common law marriage in the 1800s to legitimize cohabitation by a
couple who sought to be married lawfully but lived so far from the county
seat that travel by horseback to the courthouse to obtain a marriage license
would not have been feasible.89 Although Louisiana will recognize
common law marriages from other states, the state has rejected this
approach by first criminalizing cohabitation and then later refusing to
affirmatively adopt common law marriage in its Civil Code.90
b. The ALI’s 2001 Chapter 6 Principles: A Revival of Common Law
Marriage?
In 2001, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) promulgated principles
that suggested a new status similar to that of common law marriage.91 The
ALI principles presuppose that long-term stable cohabitation gives rise to
the rights and responsibilities of marriage.92 The purposes of the ALI’s
Chapter 6 principles were to “enhance and safeguard the rights of . . .
cohabitants” while “diminish[ing] the possibility that those rights may be
reduced or eliminated by an agreement of the parties.”93 Put simply, the
promulgators of ALI’s principles believed that eligible unmarried couples
should have the same economic rights as spouses at the time of relationship
dissolution. This includes equitable distribution of property and debts
acquired during the relationship and compensatory payments to replace
alimony and spousal maintenance.94 Although this solution was

87. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1706. Common law marriage has four elements:
(1) capacity to contract, (2) a present agreement to be married, (3) cohabitation
for a period of time, and (4) holding out to the community as husband and wife.
Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 712–13 (1996).
88. Bowman, supra note 87, at 715 (noting that only 11 states and the District
of Columbia recognize common law marriage); see also Reppy, supra note 63, at
1705.
89. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1707.
90. See infra Part IV.B.
91. Westfall, supra note 83, at 1467.
92. Blumberg, supra note 64, at 1295.
93. Westfall, supra note 83, at 1468.
94. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.04 to 6.06, at 1043–50 (2002); see also
KELSO, supra note 63, § 1:5, at 6.
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unsuccessful, the ALI’s Chapter 6 Principles established a need for the law
to recognize unmarried cohabitation as an important family status.95
c. Washington’s Unique “Committed Intimate Relationship” Status
Washington is the only community property state to have taken a
status approach that views individuals involved in committed, intimate
relationships as analogous to marital partners.96 Washington recognizes
unmarried cohabitation as a legal status, but only for the limited purpose
of property distribution upon dissolution of the relationship.97 The state’s
property distribution scheme for unmarried cohabitants is the same for
married couples, except that the scheme only applies to property acquired
during the relationship.98 In Olver v. Fowler, the Washington Supreme
Court created the concept of a “committed intimate relationship,” which
resembles common law marriage but adds the element of intertwined
financial affairs.99 Beginning with In re Marriage of Lindsey,100 the
Washington Supreme Court started blending its treatment of married
couples and unmarried cohabitants by adopting a rule requiring the “just
and equitable” disposition of cohabitants’ property based on the nature of
the relationship and property.101 The court takes into consideration factors
such as whether the cohabitation was continuous, the duration and purpose
of the relationship, and the pooling of resources and services for joint
projects.102 The Washington method is an example of a creative solution
to the inequity caused by disallowing property rights for unmarried
cohabitants.

95. AM. LAW INST., supra note 94, §§ 6.04 to 6.06, at 1043–50; see also
KELSO, supra note 63, § 1:5, at 6.
96. See Olsen, supra note 83, at 1092–93.
97. Glover, supra note 18, at 757.
98. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (en banc); see also
Glover, supra note 18, at 757.
99. Olver v. Fowler, 126 P.3d 69, 72 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); see also
Goldberg, supra note 76, at 483.
100. 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
101. Id. at 331; see also Jennifer L. King, Comment, First Comes Love, Then
Comes Marriage? Applying Washington’s Community Property Marriage Statutes
to Cohabitational Relationships, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543, 544–45 (1997).
102. Foster v. Thilges, 812 P.2d 523, 524–25 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); see also
Olsen, supra note 83, at 1092–93.
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d. New Zealand’s Domestic Partnership Laws
Other countries also employ a status approach to address property
accrued during unmarried cohabitational relationships. In 2005, New
Zealand created an institution of civil unions,103 which granted cohabitants
full property rights similar to those married couples enjoy by imposing a
legal status upon those couples that live together.104 The creation of this
institution was prompted because one-fifth of all couples cohabiting in
New Zealand were living in de facto marriages.105 New Zealand created a
statutory regime for unmarried cohabitants in de facto marriages by
incorporating them into the Property (Relationships) Act of 1976.106
For a plaintiff to bring a claim, the de facto relationship must have
lasted for at least three years.107 If the relationship is shorter than the
requisite three years, however, the plaintiff may still have a claim if (1) a
child was born of the de facto relationship or the applicant has made a
substantial contribution to the de facto relationship, and (2) the court is
satisfied that failure to provide the order would result in serious injustice
to one of the parties.108 Upon separation, a de facto partner has three years
to file an application for “divorce” with the court or his or her right to a
claim expires.109 Upon dissolution, the court first looks globally at all of
the couple’s property and divides that property into “relationship” and
“separate” property.110 The court then divides the “relationship” property
using the rules of equal property distribution.111 New Zealand recognized
an inequity was created where one party, typically the female partner,
leaves the relationship in a greatly disadvantaged financial position in
terms of both income and living standards.112 As a solution to this problem,
the New Zealand judiciary has the unique power to grant compensation in
103. Aloni, supra note 8, at 600.
104. Id. at 605.
105. Atkin, supra note 83, at 303 n.1, 312 (noting that the Property
(Relationships) Act of 1976 was formerly named the Marital Property Act).
106. Id. at 312.
107. Property (Relationships) Act 1976, § 2(E) (N.Z.); see also Aloni, supra
note 8, at 602 n.147; Atkin, supra note 83, at 316.
108. Property (Relationships) Act 1976, § 14A(2) (N.Z.); see also Atkin, supra
note 83, at 317.
109. Property (Relationships) Act 1976, § 24 (N.Z.); see also Atkin, supra note
73, at 319.
110. Atkin, supra note 83, at 320.
111. Id. at 320. The rules of equal property distribution in New Zealand are
similar to that of Louisiana’s community property regime.
112. Property (Relationships) Act 1976, § 15 (N.Z.); see also Atkin, supra note
83, at 320.
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cases of economic disparity.113 New Zealand’s imposition of a legal status
shows that not only is the United States employing a status approach
through common law marriage, the ALI’s Chapter 6 Principles, and
Washington’s “committed intimate relationship,” but also that other
countries are seeing the same rise in cohabitation and responding to
inequities caused through the use of a legal status.
2. The Marvin Contractual Approach
The second approach to finding property rights for unmarried
cohabitants is the contract approach, which California pioneered and many
other states have followed.114 In 1976, the California Supreme Court
decided the landmark case of Marvin v. Marvin, holding that express and
implied contracts between cohabitants are valid.115 In this case, the
plaintiff quit her job to be a “homemaker” in return for the defendant’s
support.116 The plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant had entered into
an oral agreement to live together, combine their earnings, and share
equally in any property accumulated during the relationship.117 The
California Supreme Court held that contracts between unmarried partners
are enforceable unless those contracts are explicitly founded on sexual
services similar to prostitution, which would violate public policy.118
In the absence of an express contract, the court can inquire into the
parties’ conduct to determine whether the court can find an implied
contract or any other contractual remedy.119 The Marvin court
acknowledged that a couple living together should have the right to
contract with each other regarding property to prevent the inequity that
could arise where the female cohabitant was left destitute when the male
cohabitant, who produced all the earnings, exited the relationship.120 After
Marvin, courts in other jurisdictions began to follow suit, using express or
113. Property (Relationships) Act 1976, § 15 (N.Z.); see also Atkin, supra note
83, at 320.
114. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1686–87; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing
why these express and implied contracts had been previously found unenforceable).
115. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 122–23.
119. Id. at 123.
120. Goldberg, supra note 74, at 5–6. This ruling only concerns the legal
obligation one nonmarital partner may have against the other person at the
dissolution of the relationship by death or separation, and does not concern claims
against the public or the government. Blumberg, supra note 64, at 1273.
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implied contract remedies to address financial disputes between unmarried
cohabitants.121 Most other American community property jurisdictions,
such as Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wisconsin, use the
Marvin approach to deal with the allocation of unmarried couples’
property on a contractual basis.122 Other than Washington, which employs
the status approach, Louisiana is the only community property jurisdiction
that prohibits contractual relationships between unmarried partners.123
3. France’s Blending of the Intermediate Status and Contract
Approach
France has chosen to blend both the status and contract approaches to
create a compromise solution.124 French cohabitants can register for a
Parte Civile de Solidarite, or PACS, which is an intermediate status that
“is neither a legal union nor a simple property contract. It is neither public
nor private. It is neither for couples nor for pairs of friends. It is neither a
legal recognition of . . . couples nor is it non-recognition.”125 Instead,
PACS is popular because it is a status that allows for a simple form of
partnership between two adults while providing the couple with a legal
status.126 French law defines cohabitation as “a de facto stable and
continuous relationship between two persons of different sexes or of the
same sex living together as a couple.”127 Although originally drafted to
create domestic partnership laws for homosexuals, this legislation also
allows for heterosexual unions128 and has been widely successful among
121. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR., MAUREEN MCBRIEN & PATRICIA A.
KINDREGAN, FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 24:1, in 2 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE
SERIES 1–4 (4th ed. 2013).
122. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc); Marvin,
557 P.2d 106; Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984); Merrill v. Davis, 673 P.2d
1285 (N.M. 1983); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987); see also Olsen,
supra note 83, at 1096.
123. See Olsen, supra note 83, at 1097.
124. Claude Martin & Irène Théry, The PACS and Marriage and Cohabitation
in France, 15 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 135, 150 (2001).
125. Aloni, supra note 8, at 634 (quoting Martin & Théry, supra note 124, at 150).
126. See Joëlle Godard, PACS Seven Years On: Is It Moving Towards
Marriage?, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 310, 312 (2007); see also CODE CIVIL [C.
CIV.] art. 515-1 (Fr.).
127. Godard, supra note 126, at 312 (“The civil pact of solidarity is a contract
binding two adults of different sexes or of the same sex, in order to organize their
common life.”); see also C. CIV. art. 515-8 (Fr.).
128. Aloni, supra note 8, at 633–34 (“In France, the demand for legal
recognition of same-sex partnerships was the catalyst for the enactment of the
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the heterosexual population in France. So far, millions of couples have
chosen to register for PACS.129
To form a PACS union, the couple registers in the presence of two
witnesses at a city hall without any rituals,130 and then the Clerk of the
Court of First Instance records the union.131 Contract law governs PACS
unions, but the couple may convert a PACS union to marriage at any
time.132 The marriage of either partner, mutual agreement between the
partners, or unilateral request of one party after three months will
terminate the PACS union.133 French law establishes mutual obligations to
live together and provide assistance, but maintenance obligations are
extinguished after dissolution.134 Whether through status, contract, or
France’s unique blending of the two approaches, jurisdictions around the
country and the globe have recognized the need to change outdated laws
and provide unmarried cohabitants with property rights.
III. PARAMOURS, CONCUBINES, AND “ILLICIT CONCUBINAGE”
IN LOUISIANA
In the midst of a barrage of solutions that other jurisdictions from
around the country and the world provide, Louisiana remains obstinate
with antiquated laws. In 1983, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided Schwegmann v. Schwegmann,135 holding that contracts between
unmarried cohabitants are against public policy, and this case remains
Louisiana’s unanimously cited authority regarding unmarried cohabitation.136

PACS. . . . At the same time, the French legislature genuinely wished to respond
to the . . . reality of cohabiting opposite sex couples.”).
129. Id. at 632–33.
130. Id. at 636.
131. Godard, supra note 126, at 313.
132. Aloni, supra note 8, at 636; see also Godard, supra note 126, at 313.
133. Aloni, supra note 8, at 636.
134. Godard, supra note 126, at 318; see also C. CIV. art. 515-4 (Fr.). These
obligations are similar to the Louisiana provisions on spousal support. See LA.
CIV. CODE art. 115 (2015).
135. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
136. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writ on the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Schwegmann on January 6, 1984. Id. at 316. Schwegmann, however, remains
Louisiana’s authority regarding rights between unmarried cohabitants in intimate
relationships. For the most recent cases citing Schwegmann regarding these
couples’ rights, see In re Kinkade, 707 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2013) and McCain
v. Cassidy, 68 So. 3d 631, 634 (La. Ct. App. 2011). Even without specifically
citing Schwegmann, circuits will also frequently follow the prohibition of property
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Louisiana retains a strict public policy that unmarried cohabitation is
“concubinage,” which is immoral and should not be equal to the institution of
marriage.137 This public policy, however, is at odds with modern society’s
acceptance of cohabitation.138 Further, the policy of depriving cohabitants of
property rights has not significantly furthered the state’s goal of promoting
marriage. Therefore, Louisiana must change its archaic public policy
regarding unmarried cohabitation.
A. Louisiana’s Harsh Treatment of Cohabitation
Although many other jurisdictions have provided viable solutions to
the injustice caused by ignoring unmarried cohabitants, Louisiana has
continued to ignore this inequity. Louisiana is the only community
property state that does not recognize an avenue of recovery for property
acquired during the time the couple lived together based on express or
implied agreements.139 The practice of denying rights to cohabitants is
rooted in slavery,140 as Louisiana refused to recognize relationships
between whites and African Americans to discourage liaisons between
white men and slaves.141 This policy required all unions between slaves to
be informal marriages,142 and therefore the impact of not recognizing
property rights of cohabitants fell heavily upon African-Americans.143 As
the law’s racists origin behind a law is no longer legally acceptable, other
reasons emerged for invalidating cohabitants’ relationships, and these
reasons are currently in use.
Louisiana courts reason that contracts resembling community property
or a marriage between a man and a woman who live together are immoral
and destructive to the lawful institution of marriage.144 Although the rest
of the country simply uses the term “unmarried cohabitation,” Louisiana
rights for unmarried cohabitants. See Succession of Rhodes, 918 So. 2d 626, 627–
28 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
137. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 326.
138. See supra Part I.A.
139. See Olsen, supra note 83, at 1097; see generally Schwegmann, 441 So.
2d 316 (holding that an agreement with a concubine is meretricious).
140. Bowman, supra note 87, at 744–45; see also Reppy, supra note 63, at
1679–80; Catherine Augusta Mills, Comment, Implications of the Repeal of
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1481, 48 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1216 (1988).
141. Bowman, supra note 87, at 744–45; see also Reppy, supra note 63, at
1679–80; Mills, supra note 140, at 1216.
142. Bowman, supra note 87, at 737–38.
143. Id. at 738.
144. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 326.
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uses the archaic term “concubinage.”145 The Louisiana Supreme Court
defines concubinage as “a relationship of sexual content in which man and
woman live together as husband and wife in a state approximating
marriage.”146 Even though the legislature deleted the word “concubinage”
from the Louisiana Civil Code in 1987, the courts still refer to cohabitation
using this terminology.147
Louisiana’s courts have clearly established that express or implied
contracts between sexual partners are null if incidental to the
cohabitation.148 Louisiana has refused, since the 1850s, to recognize
agreements between couples that choose not to marry.149 The Louisiana
Supreme Court has reasoned that sanctioning concubinage would be
“repugnant to good morals and social order,”150 and that a taint from this
type of illicit relationship would mortally affect the entire contract.151 If
the relationship, motive, and purpose of contracting parties are that of

145. Id. at 320.
146. Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118, 1129 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (citing
Succession of Filhiol, 44 So. 843 (La. 1907)); see also Heatwole v. Stansbury, 33
So. 2d 196 (La. 1947) (holding that a man and woman living in concubinage were
unable to establish a community of acquets and gains under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2328).
147. Mills, supra note 140, at 1202; State v. Davis, No. 2015-KA-0456, 2015
WL 5603601, at *5 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2015) (discussing the concept of “open
concubinage”).
148. See Spaht, supra note 77, at 1551; but see ANDREA CARROLL & RICHARD
D. MORENO, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 8:3, in 16 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 836 (4th ed. 2013) (“If there is a valid cause, such as a business purpose,
for the partnership, the agreement will stand even though the partners are
lovers.”); Mills, supra note 140, at 1201 n.4, n.6 (noting that although in theory,
business contracts between unmarried sexual partners are allowed, the test the
court developed precluded recovery in most cases and that concubinage is usually
described as “illicit, immoral, or meretricious”); Goldberg, supra note 74, at 6
(noting that Louisiana retains the term concubinage and has strict requirements to
establish a share in business property); Rochelle v. Hezeau, 15 La. Ann. 306
(1860); Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 325; Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So. 2d
1272, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
149. Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316, 319 (850).
150. Rochelle, 15 La. Ann. at 307.
151. Simpson v. Normand, 26 So. 266, 267 (La. 1899); Foshee v. Simkin, 174
So. 2d 915, 920 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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concubine152 and paramour,153 the court will not uphold the contract.154 If
a concubine renders services that are “intertwined with her illegal
cohabitation,” the court will find these services are indistinguishable from
the relationship and will not allow the concubine to seek recompense.155
Following this line of reasoning, the Fifth Circuit decided the seminal
case regarding unmarried cohabitation in modern-day Louisiana. In
Schwegmann,156 the court held that because the parties created a legal
partnership based on a sexual relationship, the alleged agreement was
meretricious and therefore void.157 The Schwegmann court ruled that
because the oral agreement was between a paramour and a concubine
engaged in sexual relations, the contract was invalid.158 The plaintiff, Ms.
Blackledge, had no rights to the property through express or implied
contract, equitable liens, or quantum meruit.159
In Schwegmann, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the parties had an
opportunity to marry and gain the resulting property rights, but they chose
not to marry.160 The court reasoned that to find an implied contract between
the couple would require characterizing an illicit relationship as a
marriage.161 The court refused plaintiff’s claim that society’s values had
changed so drastically as to create a need to protect cohabitants’ property
rights.162 The court explained that Louisiana has a valid reason to discourage
cohabitational relationships; these relationships erode the family, which the
court asserted was the cornerstone of society.163 The court reasoned that
equating concubinage with marriage would encourage an illegitimate
relationship over the legitimate institution of marriage.164 Because the
cohabitants voluntarily chose not to marry, the court reasoned, they should
not have expected to receive the civil effects of marriage.165
152. A concubine is a woman who “occupies the position, performs the duties,
and assumes the responsibilities of a wife, without the title and privileges flowing
from a legal marriage.” Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 323.
153. “Louisiana terminology for a man with whom a concubine lives is a
‘paramour.’” Id.
154. Sparrow v. Sparrow, 93 So. 2d 232, 234 (La. 1957).
155. Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459, 465 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
156. 441 So. 2d 316.
157. Id. at 322.
158. Id. at 323–26.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 322.
161. Id. at 323–24.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 326.
165. Id.
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In 2005, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed
Schwegmann by holding that the contract in question was unenforceable,
because its true cause was love, affection, and sex.166 The most recent
Louisiana appellate case citing Schwegmann reasoned that if the parties’
intimate relationship was consideration for work performed, then the
contract would be null.167 Louisiana courts have continuously upheld the
principle that providing any of the benefits of marriage to a “mere
cohabitant” will depreciate the lawful institution of marriage.168 In contrast
to the modern American view that cohabitation is acceptable, under current
Louisiana law, courts will not permit parties who make a pooling-ofearnings contract to separate the contract from the “illicit sexual union.”169
Louisiana’s position has often led to unjust results concerning cohabitants’
monetary and property rights at the end of such relationships.170
B. The Eroded Rationale of Louisiana’s Negative Status Approach
Because Louisiana courts still retain a firm grip on the negative status
approach, inequity persists throughout the state.171 In Louisiana, cohabitation
is seen as morally repugnant, and contracts between unmarried cohabitants—
or concubine and paramour, as Louisiana refers to these couples—are void.172
Therefore, marriage is the only option with which to confer property rights
from one partner to the other.173 Society’s views have changed so
dramatically, however, that Louisiana’s public policy is now outdated, and
penalizing cohabitants is not an effective means of promoting marriage.

166. Succession of Rhodes, 918 So. 2d 626, 630 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
167. McCain v. Cassidy, 68 So. 3d 631, 634 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
168. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1680.
169. Id. at 1685.
170. Mills, supra note 140, at 1201–02.
171. After the gruesome murder of her husband, a wife was denied benefits
because she was married six days less than the Veterans’ Affairs’ (“V.A.”)
requirement of one year. Entitlement to Recognition of the Appellant as the
Surviving Spouse of the Veteran for the Purpose of Establishing Entitlement to
(VA) Death Benefits, 2013 WL 2899095, at *5 (Bd. Veterans App., Dep’t
Veterans’ Affairs Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter V.A. Hearing]. The Board reasoned
that if Louisiana would have recognized cohabitation as a lawful marriage, the
widow may have been eligible to receive benefits. Id. In 2013, however, the V.A.
cited Schwegmann in its denial of compensation to a Shreveport, Louisiana
resident. Id. at *3.
172. See, e.g., Sparrow v. Sparrow, 93 So. 2d 232, 234 (La. 1957).
173. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
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1. Public Policy: The Alleged Immorality of Concubinage
Louisiana courts have established that most onerous contracts between
unmarried cohabitants are against public policy because these contracts are
immoral.174 The Louisiana Civil Code forbids contracts if the cause of the
agreement is contrary to public policy.175 Therefore, establishing whether
these contracts are actually against public policy is vital. Louisiana’s law
imposes, under the color of public policy, a sense of morality that not
everyone shares.176 The authority for the conclusion in Schwegmann that a
contract between unmarried persons would violate the public policy of “good
morals” is weak, at best.177 The court implicitly compared cohabitation to
prostitution, which is quite different from a modern couple living together and
combining earnings.178 In Schwegmann, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
suggestion to allow contracts for cohabitants based on the rising social
acceptance of these types of relationships “at this time.”179 Because this case
is now 30 years old and is still being applied in a vastly different moral
atmosphere, the time has finally come for Louisiana to overturn this decision.
Even though Louisiana courts cite morality as the basis for their disdain
of cohabitation, their reasoning is misguided and can cause more harm than
good. From a general public policy perspective, the legislature should not base
laws solely on morality considerations. This viewpoint is demonstrated in
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas,180 where she stated
that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, moral
considerations alone do not provide a rational basis for laws that discriminate
between differing groups of people.181 Further, for the courts to say that many
of the state’s citizens are immoral as a matter of law is problematic. Even if
one finds morality to be a sufficient basis for a law, Louisiana’s current law is
discriminatory because this law places women at a disadvantage.182 Most of
174. Mills, supra note 140, at 1201.
175. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1968 (2015) (“The cause of an obligation is unlawful
when the enforcement of the obligation would produce a result prohibited by law
or against public policy.”); see also CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3,
at 836.
176. Mills, supra note 140, at 1208.
177. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 835.
178. Id.
179. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
180. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
181. Id.
182. See Rochelle v. Hezeau, 15 La. Ann. 306, 306 (La. 1860) (holding that
mother’s heir could not recover undivided half of all property between mother and
her paramour); Simpson v. Normand, 26 So. 266, 270 (La. 1899) (holding that
because of her status as concubine, the plaintiff had no remedy); Succession of
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the cohabitation cases involve a woman dependent upon a man for
support.183 Leaving these women destitute by allowing the man to renege
on his promise to support and share property with her is unjust. Another
unjust situation can arise when a working woman who has contributed
financially to the property acquired during the relationship is left with
diminished assets and no means of relief.184
Society’s values have changed so considerably in the last 30 years that
the public generally no longer views cohabitation as unequivocally illicit.
Social acceptance of unmarried cohabitation continues to grow today,185
and courts should not impose a standard based on morals that the public
has largely abandoned.186 The country has also undergone a sexual
revolution, which has disintegrated the main grounds for the earlier
disapproval of cohabitation and helped to remove the stigma attached to
Filhiol, 44 So. 843, 847 (La. 1907) (noting that the bachelor’s concubine could
not recover); Sparrow v. Sparrow, 93 So. 2d 232, 234 (La. 1957) (holding that
there could be no valid partnership between the decedent and plaintiff because of
their concubinage); Foshee v. Simkin, 174 So. 2d 915, 919 (La. Ct. App. 1965)
(noting that the woman could not recover from her partnership because it was one
of concubinage); Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459, 461 (La. Ct. App. 1968)
(holding that plaintiff’s services in business were so intertwined with her
cohabitation that she could not recover); Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So. 2d
1272, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that a concubine will only be allowed to
recover for her part of a business if she shows by strict and conclusive proof that
her capital and industry were obtained independent of the concubinage);
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 325 (holding that plaintiff was not allowed to recover
due to concubinage being unlawful); Succession of Rhodes, 918 So. 2d 626, 630
(La. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the true cause of the contract was sex, so plaintiff
could not recover); V.A. Hearing, supra note 171, at *5 (noting that if Louisiana
allowed common law marriage, the widow would have been able to recover after
her husband was brutally murdered).
183. See Rochelle, 15 La. Ann. at 306; Simpson, 26 So. at 270; Succession of
Filhiol, 44 So. at 847; Sparrow, 93 So. 2d at 234; Foshee, 174 So. 2d at 919;
Guerin, 212 So. 2d at 461; Broadway, 417 So. 2d at 1276; Schwegmann, 441 So.
2d at 325; Succession of Rhodes, 918 So. 2d at 630; V.A. Hearing, supra note 171,
at *5.
184. Vespa & Painter, supra note 43, at 986.
185. KELSO, supra note 63, § 1:5, at 6.
186. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). The social
view of unmarried partners is drastically and continuously losing its moral
disapproval. In 1980, the New York Appellate Court refused to call unmarried
cohabitation “meretricious” because to do so would equate this sort of relationship
with prostitution, which did not make sense as it was too judgmental and did not
appropriately define cohabitation. Brigner, supra note 19, § 2:66 (quoting Morone
v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 486 n.2 (1980)).
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cohabitation.187 As cohabitation’s worldwide social acceptance continues
to increase to the point where over 7.6 million romantic couples are
cohabiting, Louisiana’s reasoning that condemns individuals’ choices to
cohabit grows more dubious.188 Louisiana’s civil law was born out of the
spirit of mutual respect and cooperation for the common good.189
Louisiana ought to transform the law and continue this heritage of acting
for the common good by protecting the person in the weaker bargaining
position. The legislature should respond to the expectations of society and
revoke the outdated laws condemning concubinage.190 Overall, Louisiana’s
public policy is at odds with the rising number of cohabitants today and
society’s transformed set of values.
2. Guardians of the Sanctity of Marriage
Louisiana justifies forbidding contracts and property rights for
unmarried cohabitants because the protection of the institution of marriage
is a significant state interest. The state fears that allowing cohabitants
rights similar to the rights that arise under marriage would degrade the
institution altogether.191 This notion of marriage as a “state interest” is
peculiar when one considers the history of the institution of marriage,
which started as a private custom between families, rather than one
involving the state.192 The marriage contract used to only consist of an
agreement between parties, cohabitation, and community recognition of
their status.193 The requirement of a formal marriage is relatively recent in
Anglo-American law.194 Therefore, this requirement casts doubt on this
basis on which Louisiana continues to disallow contracts between
cohabitants.
Further, refusal to acknowledge these relationships does not fulfill the
state’s purpose of furthering the institution of marriage.195 Louisiana’s
public policy of discouraging concubinage to promote the institution of
marriage is the primary obstacle to allowing property rights for unmarried

187. Smock, supra note 1, at 5.
188. Blumberg, supra note 64, at 1296; see also Aloni, supra note 8, at 580;
Mather & Lavery, supra note 20; Tavernise, supra note 20, A22.
189. Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301,
310 (1998).
190. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1685.
191. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
192. Bowman, supra note 87, at 718.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 719 (noting that informal marriage existed in England until 1753).
195. Mills, supra note 140, at 1218.
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cohabitants.196 A slight shift in public policy away from the condemnation
of concubinage and towards the promotion of marriage, however, makes
this impediment unreasonable.197 In fact, cohabitation can actually help
fulfill the state’s goal of promoting marriage. Cohabitation assists
marriage by “laying the groundwork” for future wealth accumulation
through the experience of managing a household budget.198 Studies show
that those couples who cohabit before marrying are likely to experience a
wealth premium that is twice as large as those who choose to marry
without cohabiting first.199
The state asserts it has an interest in promoting marriage and purports to
protect this interest by denying sharing agreements in unstable relationships
like cohabitation.200 Penalizing cohabitants by dismissing their contract
claims has not resulted in a decrease in cohabiting couples or an increase in
the number of marriages.201 The state justifies this agenda with the argument
that stable relationships produce children and people who are less likely to be
dependent on state aid.202 For the state to coerce heterosexual cohabitants into
marriage, however, is no longer rational.203 Marriage has transformed from a
long-term relationship to a short-term one, usually coupled with separate bank
accounts, which makes past marital ideals increasingly irrelevant.204
Historical notions of marriage involved antiquated gender roles—men as
the breadwinners and women as homemakers.205 Marriage used to be
necessary for women because the institution symbolized the traditional view
of family life, legitimized children, and was sanctioned by religion.206 In
contrast, the public conventionally viewed unmarried cohabitation as
sinful.207 The increase in cohabitation, however, fails to detract from marriage,
and cohabitation’s widespread acceptance makes viewing the partners’ choice
not to marry as an attack on the institution itself implausible.208 Rather,

196. Id.
197. Id. at 1211.
198. Vespa & Painter, supra note 43, at 998.
199. Id.
200. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 839.
201. Mills, supra note 140, at 1218; see also Kathryn Venturatos Lorio,
Concubinage and Its Alternatives: A Proposal for a More Perfect Union, 26 LOY.
L. REV. 1, 27 (1980).
202. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 839.
203. Mills, supra note 140, at 1211–12.
204. Goldberg, supra note 76, at 538.
205. Lichter et al., supra note 45, at 224.
206. King, supra note 101, at 555.
207. Id.; see supra Part II.A.
208. Blumberg, supra note 64, at 1296.
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couples can choose cohabitation, at least in the short term, without
consciously denying marriage as either an alternative or likely outcome.209
Many fear rights for cohabitants would weaken the state’s positive
message about marriage in its laws and cause its citizens to view cohabitation
as a more attractive choice than marriage.210 A surprising finding, however, is
that although marriage rates have declined, desire to marry has not.211 Instead,
most cohabitants express a desire to marry, but they cannot marry because
they face obstacles to marriage, such as poverty and fear of conforming to
stereotypical gender roles.212 Therefore, the state’s current public policy is not
actually supported by results and should be changed.
IV. UNMASKING THE SEXIST EFFECTS OF LOUISIANA’S LAWS
REGARDING CONCUBINAGE
In spite of Louisiana’s purported reasoning, the true reason for the
state’s prohibition of property rights between unmarried romantic partners
must be addressed. Clearly, a solution is warranted because the bases for
Louisiana’s refusal to acknowledge contracts between cohabitants are
antiquated, lack foundation in today’s society, and do not further the
state’s goal of promoting marriage. Louisiana’s actions over the years and
its refusal to change seem suspiciously at odds with modern values.
Further, these actions are in opposition to changes to the Civil Code over
the years and jurisprudence regarding issues other than property rights that
involve unmarried cohabitants. A contract-based solution is the best fit for
the state through a legislative contravention of Schwegmann. This new
legislation would include a presumption of an equal sharing agreement
between couples to aid the courts in unraveling property disputes.
A. The Effects of Louisiana’s Laws Regarding Concubinage
No justifiable reason appears to exist for Louisiana’s clinging to
Schwegmann’s prohibition on unmarried cohabitants’ contracts. Most of
Louisiana’s purported reasoning for its continued prohibitions is
misguided and results in disproportionately sexist effects.213 One can see
these effects in Louisiana’s jurisprudence, which involves courts denying
women property rights and therefore leaving these women in a poorer
economic position. One can also see sexist effects that result from the use
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 963.
Mahoney, supra note 12, at 174–75.
Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 946–47.
Id. at 947; see supra Part I.B.
See supra Part III.B.
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of the word “concubine” in jurisprudence that is still used to refer to
women.214 These actions provide a vehicle for Louisiana to discriminate
against women across the economic spectrum by refusing to afford
protection. As discrimination and actions with sexist effects are certainly
not valid bases for a law, Louisiana must change its law on cohabitation
and so called “concubinage.”
Defunct reasoning in the jurisprudence surrounding cohabitation leaves
much room for speculation as to why Louisiana continues to refuse change.
One possible reason the legislature has not changed the law is that the courts
and the legislature want to avoid the difficult issues involved in the division
of cohabitants’ property.215 Often contracts between cohabitants are oral,
uncertain, and hard to prove without the benefits of the community property
regime’s rules and presumptions to guide the partition of property.216 But
this reason for denying reform is unfounded because legislative action
would provide the needed certainty for the courts to untangle cohabitants’
assets.217
The Louisiana Legislature and judiciary are causing sexist and
discriminatory effects, which is perpetuated by Louisiana’s constant refusal
to change. In the past, while the rest of the country allowed common law
marriages, Louisiana called women concubines and punished them by
depriving them of any property rights.218 Then, when the states that had
repealed common law marriage decided to allow contractual remedies,
Louisiana still chose to punish women and continues to do so today.
Implications of sexism are apparent in the case law, which often
involves a woman who is left in a worse condition financially upon
dissolution of the relationship.219 Interestingly, a man has rarely brought a
214. See Rochelle v. Hezeau, 15 La. Ann. 306, 307 (1860); Simpson v.
Normand, 26 So. 266, 1362 (La. 1899); Succession of Filhiol, 44 So. 843, 846
(La. 1907); Sparrow v. Sparrow, 93 So. 2d 232, 234 (La. 1957); Foshee v. Simkin,
174 So. 2d 915, 918 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459,
464 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (La. Ct.
App. 1982) (explaining that a concubine must prove by “strict and conclusive”
proof that she is not prohibited from co-ownership); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 325 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Succession of Bacot, 502
So. 2d 1118, 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that a homosexual man cannot be
a concubine and only a woman may be considered a concubine); Succession of
Rhodes, 918 So. 2d 626, 629 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
215. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 838–39.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Bowman, supra note 87, at 724; see infra Part IV.B.
219. See Rochelle, 15 La. Ann. at 307; Simpson, 26 So. at 1362; Succession of
Filhiol, 44 So. at 846; Sparrow, 93 So. 2d at 234; Foshee, 174 So. 2d at 918;
Guerin, 212 So. 2d at 464; Broadway, 417 So. 2d at 1276; Schwegmann, 441 So.
2d at 325; Succession of Rhodes, 918 So. 2d at 629; V.A. Hearing, supra note 171,
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claim seeking financial help after dissolution of the relationship,220 which
is indicative of the real-life inequities that frequently occur.221 Women are
generally the parties who seek spousal and child support, although men
often lack the desire to pay for that support.222 Women are more frequently
economically dependent upon men than men are on women.223 Property is
more often titled in the man’s name.224 In other states, the few men who
have brought cases in this area of the law have been criminal defendants
alleging common law marriage to either strike the incriminating testimony
of his “wife” or provide a defense in statutory rape cases.225 Ironically,
even though under current Louisiana law courts award no benefits to
cohabiting women, cohabitation is taken into account when the effect is
punitive to women.226 Although women cannot win a successful claim for
alimony for cohabiting “in the manner of married persons,” they can lose
alimony for the very same practice.227
The archaic language used to describe women in the jurisprudence
further demonstrates sexism. The effect of the degrading description of
women who choose cohabitation over marriage as “concubines” might
possibly be negated if the cohabiting man had a similar title, but instead
the courts describe him as a “paramour.”228 Evidence of unequal treatment
of the sexes is seen in the court opinions that discuss and condemn the
wrongdoing of the “concubine” but pay little attention to the actions of the
“paramour.”
Another illustration of sexism in Louisiana’s law regarding unmarried
cohabitants is evident in sociological research. Data shows that women are
the ones pushing for cohabitation, and by forcing marriage as the only
avenue to confer property rights between partners, the law is
at *5; but see Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1130 (finding that a homosexual
man cannot be a concubine and only a woman may be considered a concubine).
220. Bowman, supra note 87, at 711.
221. Id. at 755.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 754–55.
226. See infra Part IV.B; see also Bowman, supra note 87, at 760 (noting that
the effects of common law marriage are similar to that of Louisiana concubinage).
227. LA. CIV. CODE art. 115 (2015); see infra Part IV.B (arguing that the
legislature changed the terminology, but the substance and effect of the article is
still the same); Bowman, supra note 87, at 760.
228. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 323 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(“Louisiana terminology for the man with whom a concubine lives is
‘paramour.’”). Although there is a history of cases built around the term
“concubinage” focusing on the fault of the “concubine,” the definition of
paramour in this context is simply the man who the woman lives with, thereby
placing the blame on the “concubine.”
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discriminating against those who prefer cohabitation—poor women and
career women.229 This discriminatory effect has even been pointed out to
the courts.230 One appellant noted that the courts should dissipate the
stigma of “concubine” due to the absurd results created.231 This appellant
also reasoned that such rulings under Louisiana law would be unfair to
single, working women.232 A related issue is that even though 90% of
cohabiting women expect to and want to marry,233 poor or disadvantaged
couples face significant barriers or obstacles to marriage.234 Refusing to
provide protection for unmarried cohabitants causes the law to
discriminate against those who cannot, or do not, get married.
Women also need protection under Louisiana’s laws because of the
threat of unequal bargaining power. Money is power in a relationship, and
shared power is often the crux of successful intimate relationships.235 This
fact is supported by findings that a woman’s income will matter less than
a man’s income if she does not spend her money on resources that translate
into power.236 Women benefit more than men from spending money on
household items that are often associated with “woman’s work.”237
Women are more likely than men to spend money on resources that will
benefit the family and children, in stark contrast to men, who spend more
money on indulgence items.238 One study found that women are
responsible for almost all payments for consumables, such as clothing,
food, child care, school-related costs, and medical and dental
expenditures.239 Meanwhile, men are more likely to spend most of their

229. See supra Part I.B.
230. Reply Brief of Judy Harrison, Intervenor/Appellant at 3, Succession of
Rhodes, 918 So. 2d 626 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (No. 40,469).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 3–4.
233. Lichter et al., supra note 45, at 224.
234. Clarkberg, supra note 2, at 958.
235. Elizabeth R. Carter, The Illusion of Equality: The Failure of the
Community Property Reform to Achieve Management Equality, 48 IND. L. REV.
853, 858 (2015).
236. Judith Treas & Esther de Ruijter, Earnings and Expenditures on
Household Services in Married and Cohabiting Unions, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
796, 797 (2008).
237. Id.
238. Nancy Burns et al., The Public Consequences of Private Inequality:
Family Life and Citizen Participation, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373, 377 (1997);
Charlott Nyman, Gender Equality in “the Most Equal Country in the World”?
Money and Marriage in Sweden, 47 SOC. REV. 767, 787 (1999); see also Carter,
supra note 235, at 859.
239. Burns et al., supra note 238, at 377; Nyman, supra note 238, at 787; see
also Carter, supra note 235, at 859.
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money on alcohol, motor vehicles, vacations, and gambling.240 Therefore,
women’s expenditures may be less consequential to household bargaining,
or power.241 Women’s income may be discounted more in cohabitations if
their bargaining power, undercut by societal gender inequalities, is further
undermined by other factors. These factors include lesser commitment and
lower exit costs for unmarried unions and a lack of legal protection for the
partner with lower income, usually the woman, when the cohabitation
ends.242 Thus, the state should provide some sort of legal scheme to protect
these women in cohabiting relationships.
B. Lack of Legal Grounds for the State’s Purported “Public Policy”
Condemning Cohabitation
Another basis for a belief that the legislature’s actions, which
disproportionately affect women, are unfounded and need to be changed
are the shifts in the Louisiana Civil Code and in other areas of the state’s
jurisprudence that do not support the courts’ harsh treatment of unmarried
cohabitants. Over time, Louisiana courts have relaxed restraints on certain
arrangements between unmarried persons, although this process has
occurred slowly.243 For example, in the jurisprudence, cohabitant women
have been able to recover for worker’s compensation and as beneficiaries
of life insurance policies.244 In a worker’s compensation case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated that it was unable to find a general
legislative policy signifying a need to punish cohabitants by depriving
them of all benefits or rights whatsoever based on their status as
cohabitants.245
Changes to the Louisiana Civil Code also indicate a shift away from the
legislature’s harsh treatment of unmarried cohabitants. For example, the
legislature repealed Louisiana Civil Code article 161, which prohibited
marriage between adulterer and mistress, allowing these partners to legalize
240. Burns et al., supra note 238, at 377; Nyman, supra note 238, at 787; see
also Carter, supra note 235, at 859.
241. Treas & de Ruijter, supra note 236, at 797.
242. Id. at 798.
243. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 833.
244. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 38 So. 485, 487 (La. 1905); Henderson v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (La. 1978); see also Mills, supra note
140, at 1209.
245. Henderson, 354 So. 2d at 1034 (“Further, we are unable to find any
general legislative policy indicating a desire to punish a concubine by depriving
her of all benefits or rights whatsoever because of her status.”); see also CARROLL
& MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 837.
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their relationship.246 The legislature also repealed section 79.1 of the
Criminal Code, which formerly criminalized “common law marriages,”247
thereby making concubinage no longer a crime in Louisiana.248 Though
limited in effect, the legislature repealed Louisiana Civil Code article 1481,
which restricted donations of movables and immovables between those
couples who lived together without marrying.249 Equating concubinage with
remarriage, the legislature also made cohabitation a further basis for
terminating spousal support in addition to remarriage.250 Further, the
legislature changed the wording of this article from “open concubinage”
to “cohabited with another person of either sex in the manner of married
persons.”251 This change effectively took the terminology of
“concubinage” out of the Civil Code.252 Taken together, all of these
changes coalesce into one idea—in modern society, cohabitants should be
able to contract between themselves. The trend has moved away from a
qualified disapproval of concubinage toward recognition that the
legislature should afford unmarried cohabitants certain rights and benefits
under the law.253
C. Previous Failed Solutions to the Inequity in Louisiana’s Law
Despite the changes in the law relaxing a strict condemnation of
unmarried cohabitation, Louisiana’s decision to retain its strict policy
against providing property rights for unmarried cohabitants is certainly
curious. In fact, many have noticed the inequities this lack of rights can
cause and have proposed dozens of solutions.254 Louisiana, however,
continues to ignore these proposals. Louisiana rejected California’s
Marvin approach255 as well as a proposed Civil Code article that would

246. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 838.
247. Id.
248. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:79.1 (1971), which criminalized
common law marriage, was repealed by Act No. 638 of the 1975 Regular Session
of the Louisiana Legislature. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. British Petroleum, No.
90-4594, 1991 WL 148140, at *1 (E.D. La. July 30, 1991).
249. Mills, supra note 140, at 1211–12; see supra Part III.
250. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 838.
251. Id. at 838 n.27; LA. CIV. CODE art. 115 (2015).
252. Louisiana courts still use this term despite its legislative suppression. See
supra Part III.
253. Mills, supra note 140, at 1206.
254. See infra Part IV.C.3.
255. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 326 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
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have allowed contracts between unmarried cohabitants.256 The state has
also ignored numerous legal scholars’ solutions to the unfair treatment of
cohabitants.257 Finally, in 2004, Louisiana passed the Defense of Marriage
amendment to the Louisiana Constitution, which refused to allow any
marriage-like status to cohabitants.258 These examples of the refusal of
Louisiana courts, legislature, and constituents to change an antiquated law
to adapt to the expectations of modern society are antithetical to what the
state should do—give women equality and freedom regarding their
property.
1. Rejection of Marvin
First, through the Schwegmann decision in 1983, Louisiana rejected
the use of Marvin’s contractual remedies to provide relief for the lower
earning partner after dissolution of a cohabiting relationship.259 The Fifth
Circuit examined Marvin but dismissed the rationale of the case, saying
that the social acceptance of non-marital sexual relationships was not a
justifiable ground to abandon the “Louisiana concept of the unlawfulness
of a concubinage relationship.”260 Although courts continue to cite to
Schwegmann’s reasoning, the social and moral climate of the state has
changed so drastically in the last 30 years that this answer is no longer
acceptable.261
2. The Rejection of Proposed Article 101 in the Wake of the Repeal
of Article 1481
In the wake of Schwegmann’s ban on contracts between unmarried
cohabitants, the Persons Committee of the Louisiana Law Institute proposed
a new Civil Code article 101 to allow sharing agreements between
256. H.B. 1139, 1987 Reg. Sess. (La. 1987) (“An otherwise valid contract is
not rendered unenforceable solely because the parties, neither of whom was
married, were cohabitants at the time of contracting, but such a contract must be
in writing.”); see also Spaht, supra note 67, at 297–98.
257. See infra Part IV.C.3.
258. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15.
259. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 326 (“Paramount in the review of the petition
is the recognition it was molded in conformity with the distinctions drawn by the
Supreme Court of the State of California in Marvin v. Marvin. . . . Furthermore,
we do not believe the prevalence and social acceptance of non-marital sexual
relationship at this time is justifiable grounds to abandon the Louisiana concept
of the unlawfulness of a concubinage relationship.”(citation omitted)).
260. Id.
261. See supra Part II.B.
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unmarried persons, regardless of gender, so long as the agreements are in
writing.262 The Committee considered many options, ranging from a
positive statement that contracts between unmarried cohabitants were
unenforceable to the adoption of common law marriage, before finally
deciding to propose article 101.263 This article would have preserved the
uniqueness of marriage while satisfying the reasonable expectations of
cohabitants who intended and agreed that their relationship should have
legal consequences.264
Proposed article 101 was defeated in the Senate.265 Strangely enough,
the legislature was willing to repeal a Civil Code article prohibiting
gratuitous contracts of donation between unmarried cohabitants—article
1481.266 The pivotal question revolved around “whether onerous contracts
between unmarried cohabitants, when not independent of the sexual
relationship, [would] remain contrary to public policy and null under
article 1968.”267 From the repeal of article 1481, courts could have inferred
that some contracts, specifically donations between cohabitants, were no
longer against public policy and no longer subject to invalidation under
article 1968.268 In repealing article 1481, the legislature seemingly
intended to make a broader statement about the public policy concerning
cohabitation in general.269 When viewed in connection with the rejection
of enforceable contracts between unmarried cohabitants, however, the
repeal of article 1481 suggested a less expansive legislative intent.270
The legislature, by refusing to adopt a provision on cohabitation,
apparently intended to allow the jurisprudence surrounding article 1481 to
continue in effect.271 The rejection of article 101 confirmed that the law still
favors marriage over cohabitation.272 Therefore, cohabitants’ contracts
remained subject to antiquated notions of public policy that evolved from
religious beliefs and opposition to interracial relationships.273 The rejection
262. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 839; Mills, supra note
140, at 1204–05.
263. Mills, supra note 140, at 1204.
264. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2045 (2015) (“Interpretation of a contract
is the determination of the common intent of the parties.”).
265. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 839.
266. Id.
267. Mills, supra note 140, at 1203.
268. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1968 (“The cause of an obligation is unlawful when
the enforcement of the obligation would produce a result prohibited by law or
against public policy.”); see also Mills, supra note 140, at 1203.
269. Mills, supra note 140, at 1204.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1204–05.
272. Id. at 1204, 1206.
273. Id. at 1205.
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of article 101 suggests that the legislature did not wish to extend to
cohabitants the option of entering into a relationship similar to marriage but
governed by contract law rather than family law.274 This rejection made
clear that courts will not enforce all contracts between cohabitants but did
not preclude otherwise enforceable contracts as long as they do not violate
public policy.275
3. Commentary Calling for Change
Several commentators have written law review articles both
recognizing this inequity and proposing a solution, but the legislature has
ignored these attempts and refuses to provide any sort of remedy for
cohabitants. For example, shortly after Marvin, Duke University Professor
William A. Reppy, Jr. proposed an intermediate status approach for
Louisiana cohabitants.276 Immediately following the rejection of article
101, Catherine Mills, a law student, proposed a “sliding scale” for
contracts that should no longer be against public policy.277 As recently as
2013, Erez Aloni, a Fellow at Columbia Law School, proposed a registered
relationship status for unmarried cohabitants similar to the French
PACS.278 Louisiana’s inflexible will and failure to consider any of these
viable solutions show evidence of discriminatory effects.279
4. Louisiana’s 2004 Defense of Marriage Amendment
The most recent legislative expression regarding unmarried cohabitants’
property rights was the 2004 Defense of Marriage Amendment (“DOMA”) to
the Louisiana Constitution.280 DOMA does not expressly prevent unmarried
persons from using partnership laws or the general obligations provisions of
the Louisiana Civil Code to contract a regime similar to the legal
community.281 DOMA, however, does provide in relevant part, “[a] legal
status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried
individuals shall not be valid or recognized.”282 Therefore, the Louisiana
274. Id. at 1206.
275. Id. at 1227.
276. Reppy, supra note 63, at 1716–22.
277. Mills, supra note 140, at 1217–20.
278. Aloni, supra note 8, at 644–48.
279. See supra Part IV.A.
280. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; see also CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148,
§ 8:3, at 833.
281. CARROLL & MORENO, supra note 148, § 8:3, at 833.
282. Id. Although the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges, No. 14–556 (U.S. 2015) (slip opinion), rendered most of Louisiana’s
DOMA unconstitutional, it is likely that this is the one portion that will still be
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Constitution removes all options of a status-based solution, unless the
public repeals or further amends DOMA. The only remaining remedy is
grounded in contract law, but Louisiana has thus far refused to overrule
Schwegmann and its progeny.
D. The Solution: A Presumption of Equality
When searching for a solution to this discrimination problem, one
must remember that cohabiting relationships are varied in nature, so no
one approach is perfectly suited.283 But the legislature should not force
couples choosing a cohabiting relationship into the ill-fitting laws of
marriage, thereby ruling out a status approach.284 Coupled with DOMA’s
implied prohibition of a status approach, the only remaining remedy is to
employ a contract approach. Louisiana Civil Code article 2801, which
allows contracts “between two or more persons to combine their efforts or
resources in determined proportions and to collaborate at mutual risk for
their common profit or commercial benefit,”285 would justify this
approach.
The legislature should enact a new Civil Code article that would allow
unmarried cohabitants to expressly contract between each other, thereby
legislatively overruling Schwegmann.286 The contract would need to be
express but would not have to be in writing, as practicality and the
jurisprudence indicates that most couples do not write out these
agreements.287 Further, Louisiana should create a presumption of an
agreement between unmarried cohabitants to split property accumulated
during the relationship equally. This presumption would solve the inequity
constitutional, as it is the only portion not prohibiting homosexuals the right to
marry.
283. King, supra note 101, at 570–71.
284. Id.
285. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801 (2015).
286. This Comment does propose a solution because the proposal is not the
main focus of this Comment. Several scholars have proposed solutions, see supra
Part IV.C.3, but thus far, the courts have refused to adopt any changes to the law.
The focus of this Comment is instead to determine why Louisiana has chosen to
cling to the outdated, discriminatory laws prohibiting cohabiting partners’
property rights.
287. See generally Rochelle v. Hezeau, 15 La. Ann. 306 (La. 1860); Simpson
v. Normand, 26 So. 266 (La. 1899); Succession of Filhiol, 44 So. 843 (La. 1907);
Sparrow v. Sparrow, 93 So. 2d 232 (La. 1957); Foshee v. Simkin, 174 So. 2d 915
(La. Ct. App. 1965); Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1968);
Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So. 2d 1272 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Schwegmann v.
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Succession of Bacot, 502 So.
2d 1118 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Succession of Rhodes, 918 So. 2d 626 (La. Ct. App.
2d 2005); V.A. Hearing, supra note 171, at *5.
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between partners by shifting the burden to the party claiming that the
partners did not have such an agreement. Almost every other jurisdiction
in the United States has provided property rights for unmarried
cohabitants. With this in mind, Louisiana must provide a remedy for
cohabiting women. If the legislature fails to adopt this change, both the
legislature and the courts should consider all other options to provide
women some remedy. Both branches of Louisiana’s government have
plenty of options and models to follow, so no excuse exists for Louisiana
to refuse protection for unmarried cohabiting women any longer.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has demonstrated the various methods with which to
fix a lack of property rights for unmarried cohabitants. Louisiana can no
longer fail to provide the rights by hiding behind antiquated reasoning. A
public policy at odds with modern society’s values is a dangerous cycle
that provides a pathway for the state to disproportionately affect women
in what appears to be a discriminatory manner. Contracts between
cohabitants are no longer against public policy and therefore Louisiana
Civil Code article 1968 should not subject these contracts to invalidation.
This state of affairs cannot stand, and the legislature should enact a new
Civil Code article with a presumption of an equal sharing agreement. In
1983, the Schwegmann court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that
society’s values had changed enough “at this time” to demonstrate a need
to protect unmarried cohabitants’ property.288 Over 30 years later, is it time
yet, Louisiana?
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288. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 326 (“Furthermore, we do not believe the
prevalence and social acceptance of non-marital sexual relationships at this time
is justifiable grounds to abandon the Louisiana concept of the unlawfulness of a
concubinage relationship.”); see supra Part III.A.
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